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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
RYANN DANELL CAMPERUD, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43575
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-2656
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-five-year-old Ryann Danell Camperud
pleaded guilty to three counts of felony issuing a check without funds. The district court
imposed concurrent unified sentences of three years, with one-and-one-half years fixed,
for all three counts. On appeal, Ms. Camperud asserts the district court abused its
discretion when it denied her request to continue sentencing to allow her to complete a
mental health evaluation.

Ms. Camperud also asserts the district court abused its

discretion when it imposed her sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
A Boise Police Department officer responded to a fraud report alleging
Ms. Camperud had made several purchases at a supply store with checks from a
closed bank account. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.3, 30.)1 The police
investigation revealed Ms. Camperud had used other checks from closed accounts to
make purchases at gas stations and convenience stores located in Ada County. (PSI,
pp.3, 36.) In a telephone interview with police, Ms. Camperud stated she had been
going through a nasty divorce, and was using the checks for necessities because she
was homeless. (PSI, pp.34-35.)
Ms. Camperud’s grandmother reported multiple unauthorized purchases made to
her bank account and three separate credit cards opened in her name. (PSI, p.3.)
Ms. Camperud’s grandmother believed Ms. Camperud had used her personal
information to open the credit cards and electronically access her checking account.
(PSI, p.3.)
The State filed a Complaint alleging Ms. Camperud had committed six counts of
issuing a check without funds, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-3106(a).
(R., pp.7-10.) The State later filed an Amended Complaint alleging Ms. Camperud had
committed four counts of issuing a check without funds, one count of grand theft, felony,
in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b) and 18-2409, and one count of
misappropriation of personal identifying information, felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 183126 and 18-3128. (R., pp.22-25.) After Ms. Camperud waived a preliminary hearing,

All citations to the PSI refer to the 532-page PDF electronic document, which includes
presentence reports from 2015, 2007, and 2002.
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the magistrate bound her over to the district court. (R., pp.28-32.) The State then filed
an Information charging Ms. Camperud with four counts of issuing a check without
funds, one count of grand theft, and one count of misappropriation of personal
identifying information. (R., pp.33-35.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Camperud agreed to plead guilty to the first
three counts of issuing a check without funds, and the State agreed to dismiss the
fourth issuing a check without funds count, the grand theft count, and the
misappropriation of personal identifying information count. (See R., p.47.) The State
would recommend that the sentences be served consecutively, with three years fixed
for the first count and three years indeterminate for each of the other two counts. (See
Tr., p.1, L.23 – p.2, L.1.) The aggregate sentencing recommendation by the State
would be three years fixed and six years indeterminate. (See Tr., p.2, Ls.1-2.) The
defense would be free to argue for a different sentence. (Tr., p.3, Ls.8-11.) The district
court accepted Ms. Camperud’s guilty pleas. (R., p.47.) The district court also ordered
a substance abuse evaluation and a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 192524. (Tr., p.13, Ls.10-14.)
Upon Ms. Camperud’s request, the district court continued sentencing to give her
the opportunity to hire private counsel. (See Tr., p.17, L.18 – p.19, L.25.) At the
sentencing hearing, Ms. Camperud informed the district court she had not secured
private counsel and requested another continuance to allow her to complete a mental
health evaluation, which she had scheduled for the week following the hearing. (See
Tr., p.21, L.22 – p.22, L.7.) The State objected to the second continuance and stated it
was Ms. Camperud’s fault the evaluation had not been done. (Tr., p.24, L.17 – p.25,

3

L.3.)

The district court determined it had sufficient information and denied

Ms. Camperud’s request for additional time. (Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.23.)
The State recommended the district court impose consecutive sentences of three
years fixed for the first count and three years indeterminate for each of the other two
counts, with an aggregate of three years fixed and six years indeterminate. (Tr., p.27,
Ls.4-19.) Ms. Camperud recommended the district court consider mental health court,
or alternatively impose concurrent sentences of two years fixed on the first count, two
years indeterminate on the second count, and two years indeterminate on the third
count. (Tr., p.32, L.25 – p.33, L.12.) The district court imposed concurrent unified
sentences of three years, with one-and-one-half years fixed, for all three counts.
(R., pp.61-64.)
Ms. Camperud filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment
and Commitment. (R., pp.69-71.)
Ms. Camperud also filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motion for a reduction of sentence. (R., p.73.) The district court denied the Rule 35
motion. (Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, Nov. 9, 2015.) On
appeal, Ms. Camperud does not challenge the district court’s denial of the
Rule 35 motion.2

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information.” Id.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Camperud’s request
to continue sentencing to allow her to complete a mental health evaluation?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed concurrent unified
sentences of three years, with one-and-one-half years fixed, upon
Ms. Camperud, following her plea of guilty to three counts of issuing a check
without funds?
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Camperud’s Request To
Continue Sentencing To Allow Her To Complete A Mental Health Evaluation
Ms. Camperud asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
request to continue sentencing to allow her to complete a mental health evaluation.
Ms. Camperud’s presentence report stated that her GAIN-I mental health
evaluation was not completed as of the date of the report because Ms. Camperud did
not attend her scheduled appointment. (PSI, p.18.) The presentence investigator could
not get a full picture of Ms. Camperud’s mental health because she did not sign a
release of information form. (PSI, p.14.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated it had reviewed the
presentence report, “which includes the previous presentence report. It does contain
information related to [Ms. Camperud’s] mental health, and, quite frankly, those
conditions are not the type of conditions that somehow just go away even over the
course of time.” (Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.3.) While it was proper to consider mental
health and rehabilitation, the district court further stated that, for the particular offenses
of issuing checks without funds, “it’s not a significant factor of my sentencing that if she
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has retained the same mental-health conditions that she’s had in the past, quite frankly,
I just don’t see it either elevating or reducing the court’s sentencing at this particular
point, and I do find that I have sufficient information.” (Tr., p.26, Ls.4-17.) The district
court also stated Ms. Camperud, despite having the opportunity, did not provide
information in a timely manner. (Tr., p.26, Ls.18-19.) Thus, the district court did not
allow Ms. Camperud additional time to do a mental health evaluation. (Tr., p.26, Ls.2123.)
Idaho Criminal Rule 32, which outlines the standards and procedures governing
presentence investigations and reports, provides that “[t]he presentence investigator
may recommend a psychological evaluation, but the decision as to whether to order a
psychological evaluation is to be made by the sentencing judge.” I.C.R. 32(d). The
Idaho Court of Appeals has therefore held that “whether to order a psychological
evaluation is a question left to the court’s discretion.” State v. Puente-Gomez, 121
Idaho 702, 705-06 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Bylama, 103 Idaho 472 (Ct. App.
1982); State v. Anderson, 103 Idaho 622 (Ct. App. 1982)).
When a district court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the district court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it,
and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,
600 (1989).
Ms. Camperud asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
request to continue sentencing to allow her to complete a mental health evaluation. The
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district court determined that whether Ms. Camperud “has retained the same mentalhealth conditions that she’s had in the past” would not be a significant factor in
sentencing. (See Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14.) The district court should have instead recognized
that Ms. Camperud’s history and the context of the instant offenses reveals a pattern of
escalating mental health issues. To ascertain the current extent of Ms. Camperud’s
mental health issues, the district court should have granted her additional time to
complete a mental health evaluation.
Ms. Camperud’s history reveals a pattern of escalating mental health issues. Her
2002 presentence report stated that she was diagnosed with “Major Depressive
Disorder, Recurrent” in 2000. (PSI, pp.466, 485.) In 2002, Ms. Camperud had been
seeing a psychologist for her major depression. (PSI, pp.466, 483.) But by 2007,
Ms. Camperud described suffering from multiple mental health issues, including “Bipolar, depression, ADHD, [and] self-esteem issues.” (PSI, p.278 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Her 2007 presentence report stated she was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder

with

recent depression

(severe without

psychosis),

attention

deficit

hyperactivity disorder, and bulimia nervosa in 2005. (PSI, p.278; see PSI, pp.395-96.)
Worryingly, Ms. Camperud reported that, due to her financial situation, she had not
been able to purchase her medications or attend counseling. (PSI, p.278.)
The context of the instant offenses indicates Ms. Camperud’s pattern of
escalating mental health issues has continued since her last psychological evaluation.
In the presentence investigation questionnaire, she explained: “When the crimes
occurred I was not on my right meds my head was foggy and I felt lost hopeless and
helpless. This is the first time in my life that my family is not helping me or supporting
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me. I wrote those checks for food.” (PSI, p.5.) During the PSI interview, she noted her
parents had kicked her out. (PSI, p.5.) Ms. Camperud stated: “I’m not good at handling
my emotions. I internally project it. I hurt bad all the time. . . . There was so much
going on when this happened.” (PSI, p.5.) She also stated, “I had a lot of life changing
events happen all at once and I did not know how to cope or deal with anything.”
(PSI, p.16.)
Thus, the context of the instant offenses indicates Ms. Camperud’s pattern of
escalating mental health issues has continued. While the district court mentioned that
whether Ms. Camperud had retained her past mental health conditions would not be a
significant factor for sentencing (see Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14), the district court should have
been concerned with how Ms. Camperud’s mental health issues have appeared
to worsen. To ascertain the current extent of Ms. Camperud’s mental health issues, the
district court should have granted her additional time to complete a mental health
evaluation.

The district court therefore abused its discretion when it denied

Ms. Camperud’s request to continue sentencing to allow her to complete a mental
health evaluation.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent Unified Sentences
Of Three Years, With One-And-One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Camperud, Following
Her Plea Of Guilty To Three Counts Of Issuing A Check Without Funds
Ms. Camperud asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
her concurrent unified sentences of three years, with one-and-one-half years fixed,
because her sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
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Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving “due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Ms. Camperud does not assert that her sentence exceeds
the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion,

Ms. Camperud must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence . . .
consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.”

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726

(2007). The reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant’s probable term of confinement.” Id.
Ms. Camperud submits that, because the district court did not give adequate
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

Specifically, the district court did not

adequately consider Ms. Camperud’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility. In her
written comments to the district court, Ms. Camperud stated: “I do take responsibility for
my choices and actions with this situation. I have made a mistake and I have proved
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that I can finish parole successfully.

I have given back to the community with my

volunteer hours with the Meth Project.” (PSI, p.16.) She continued: “I am so sorry I feel
horrible and I know I have let everyone down. I have started to make amends.” (PSI,
p.16.) Similarly, at the sentencing hearing Ms. Camperud told the district court, “I take
full responsibility for what I did. It was wrong.” (Tr., p.33, L.21-22.)
The district court also did not adequately consider Ms. Camperud’s problems
with substance abuse. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized substance abuse as
a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence to be excessive.

See, e.g.,

State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Ms. Camperud reported that methamphetamine
was her drug of choice, and that she first tried it when she was seventeen years old.
(PSI, pp.14-15; Tr., p.33, Ls.19-21.)

She was diagnosed with amphetamine

dependence, in early full remission, in 2005. (PSI, pp.395-96.) Ms. Camperud also
abused prescription medications from the age of thirty-two, and had tried marijuana and
cocaine. (PSI, pp.14-15.)
At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Camperud explained how, even though she had
previously

been

sober,

her

substance

abuse

problems

contributed

to

the

instant offenses:
A lot of things happen[ed] in my life really, really quickly, within a matter of
a week, that threw me for a loop. I did the one thing I said I would never
do, which is use again, and I did [it] to get off my pain meds that I’ve been
on for three years because of my conditions, and it led me to do things
that I haven’t done before because I was high, and my judgment was
clouded, and I’ve gone through the prison system many times.
(Tr., p.33, L.19 – p.34, L.5.)
Additionally, the district court did not give adequate consideration to
Ms. Camperud’s mental health issues.
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As discussed in Section I. above,

Ms. Camperud’s history and the context of the instant offenses reveals a pattern of
escalating mental health issues. Because the district court did not allow Ms. Camperud
additional time to complete a mental health evaluation, it had no way to ascertain the
current extent of Ms. Camperud’s mental health issues.

Thus, the district court

necessarily did not adequately consider her mental health issues.
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating
factors, Ms. Camperud’s sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Thus,
the district court abused its discretion when it imposed Ms. Camperud’s concurrent
unified sentences of three years, with one-and-one-half years fixed.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Camperud respectfully requests that this Court
vacate her sentence and remand her case to the district court so that she may undergo
a mental health evaluation before sentencing. Alternatively, Ms. Camperud respectfully
requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate, or that this Court
remand her case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2016.

____________/s/_____________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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